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Search and Seizure Under the Fourth Amendment as
Interpreted by the United States Supreme Court*
By E. G. TRLnTi* *
The first important case involving the Fourth Amendment
which came before the Supreme Court under the prohibition
Act was Carroll v. United States.' It was especially important be-
cause it involved the application of the Fourth Amendment to
the automobile. The facts of the case were that prohibition
agents on December 15, 1921, while patrolling the highway be-
tween Grand Rapids and Detroit-the latter city a notorious
source of supply of liquor for the "bootlegging" business-passed
a car containing John Carroll, his brother, and others, coming
from the direction of Detroit. The agents had heard that the Car-
roll brothers were "bootleggers". In fact, on a previous occasion
the agents had negotiated with the Carroll brothers to purchase
some liquor, but delivery was not made. When on the night of
December 15th they saw a car which they recognized as be-
longing to the Carrolls, they turned and followed it, overtook it,
and stopped and searched it. On finding liquor concealed in the
seat they arrested the occupants and seized the liquor and car.
The agents had no warrant to arrest the men or to search the car.
The occupants were tried and convicted, and appealed to the
Supreme Court on the ground that the evidence was obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment and hence could not be used
against them. Counsel for defendents contended that the true
rule was that officers could arrest without a warrant for a mis-
demeanor-the offense involved here-only when committed in
their presence. This meant that the offense had to be discoverable
without a search, which was not possible in this case.
* This is the second of three installments of this article. The first installment
appeared in the January, 1953 issue of this Journal.
1* Professor of Political Science, University of Kentucky, Lexington. A.B.,
Berea College; Ph.D., Yale University; member of Kentucky Bar.
1267 U. S. 133 (1924). Immediately prior to this case the Court had held in
Hester v. U. S., 265 U. S. 57 (1924), a "moonshine" case, that the Fourth Amend-
ment did not apply to the 6pen field.
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Chief Justice Taft wrote the opinion for the majority uphold-
ing the conviction, with Justices McReynolds and Sutherland dis-
senting. The Chief Justice quoted Section 26, Title II of the
National Prohibition Act to the effect that:
"When the commissioner, his assistants, inspectors, or any
officer of the law shall discover any person in the act of
transporting in violation of the law, intoxicating liquors in
any ... automobile ... it shall be his duty to seize any and
all intoxicating liquors found therein... and... arrest any
person in charge thereof."
He then quoted Section 6 of an Act Supplemental to the National
Prohibition Act which provided that any officer who, while en-
gaged in the enforcement of the Prohibition Act,
"Shall search any private dwelling without a warrant di-
recting such search, or who while so engaged shall without
a search warrant maliciously and without probable cause
search any other building or property shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor."2
Penalties were provided. The Chief Justice, in order to arrive
at an interpretation of this latter section, reviewed its legislative
history. The Senate had adopted the Supplemental Act and added
to it an amendment known as the Stanley Amendment. This
amendment made it a misdemeanor for any officer to "search or
attempt to search the property or premises of any person without
previously securing a search warrant". The House Judiciary Com-
mittee objected to this and offered a substitute. In its report the
Committee objected to the broad language of the Stanley Amend-
ment because it prohibited any search or attempt to search "any
property or premises without a search warrant". The report con-
tinued, "there are on the statutes books of the United States a
number of laws authorizing search without a search warrant.
Under the common law and agreeably to the constitution search
may in many cases be legally mad& without a warrant." The
amendment would, it said, "make it impossible to stop the rum-
running automobiles engaged in like illegal traffic," for "before a
warrant could be secured the automobile would be beyond the
- Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 133, 144 (1924).
3 Id. at 146.
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reach of the officer with its load of illegal liquor disposed of."3
Section 6 of the law was the result of the work of a Conference
Committee reconciling the Senate and House versions. This sec-
tion, the Chief Justice said, "left the way open for searching an
automobile, or vehicle of transportation, without a warrant, if the
search was not malicious or without probable cause." The intent
of Congress "to make a distinction between the necessity for a
search warrant in the searching of a private dwelling and in that
of automobiles and other road vehicles in the enforcement of the
Prohibition Act is thus clearly established,"4 he concluded.
He then asked if such a distinction was consistent with the
Fourth Amendment, and said that it was. To establish this he
reviewed the previous decisions of the Court interpreting the
Amendment and showed that none of these decisions involved
the exact question here raised. But he continued by saying that
"On reason and authority the true rule is that if the search
and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable
cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of the
circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an auto-
mobile ... contains that which by law is subject to seizure
and destruction, the search and seizure are valid."'
The Amendment, he said, was "to be construed in the light of
what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it
was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests
as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens." He dis-
cussed what the Amendment had meant when adopted, and, al-
though he recognized that the Boyd6 case did not turn on the
question of the reasonableness of a search without a warrant, he
quoted from the opinion to the effect that "search for and seizure
of stolen or forfeited goods or goods liable to duties and con-
cealed to avoid the payment thereof.., are totally different from
search and seizure of a man's private books and papers" to be
used against him which was the question in the Boyd case. This
quotation was used for "the purpose of showing the principle on
which the Fourth Amendment proceeds." This would seem to be
4Id. at 147.
r Id. at 149.
'For discussion see the first installment of this article in 41 Ky. L. J. 196
(1953).
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relevant only because illegally transported liquor was subject to
forfeiture.
He then referred to a number of laws passed by Congress after
the Amendment was adopted which authorized search and seizure
without a warrant and which were referred to in the Boyd Case
These laws, five in number, were passed between 1789 and 1834,
and all had to do with the enforcement of revenue laws or the
suppression of the selling of liquor to the Indian Tribes. They
permitted revenue officers or Indian agents to search boats,
wagons, stores, vehicles, etc., without a warrant on "suspicion" or
when there was "probable cause" to believe that there were con-
cealed goods subject to duty or that were otherwise contraband.
These laws, he said, showed that the Fourth Amendment had
been "construed practically since the beginning of the Govern-
ment as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a
store, dwelling houses or other structures in respect of which a
proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a
ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods,
where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle
can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought."7
The Chief Justice then addressed himself to the question as to
just what circumstances justified a search of vehicles without a
warrant. His conclusion was that it could be done on "probable
cause" and cited Section 970 of the Revised Statutes. This sec-
tion provided that:
"When in any prosecution commenced on account of the
seizure of any vessel, goods, wares, or merchandise, made
by any collector or other officer, under any act of Congress
it appears to the court that there was reasonable cause of
seizure, the Court shall cause a proper certificate thereof to
be entered, and the claimant shall not in such case be en-
titled to costs, nor shall the person who made the seizure
... be liable to suit or judgment on account of such suit or
prosecution."
"It follows from this," he said, "that if an officer seizes an auto-
mobile or the liquor in it without a warrant and the facts as sub-
sequently developed do not justify a judgment of condemnation
'Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 133, 153 (1924).
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and forfeiture, the officer may escape costs or a suit for damages
by a showing that he had reasonable or probable cause." This, he
concluded, furnished the "line of distinction between legal and
illegal seizure of liquor in transport in vehicles," and was a
"reasonable distinction" that "fulfills the guaranty of the Fourth
Amendment."'
He then considered the argument of the defense that if the
search of the car resulted in the finding of liquor and led to the
arrest of the driver the right of seizure be limited to the common
law right of arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor. (Under
the Prohibition Act the first two offenses of transporting liquor
were considered misdemeanors, while the third offense was a
felony. This case was a first offense for the defendants.) The
Chief Justice said the common law rule was that "a police officer
may arrest without a warrant one believed by the officer upon
reasonable cause to have been guilty of a felony, and that he may
only arrest without a warrant one guilty of a misdemeanor if com-
mitted in his presence." He restated the rule and made it more
accurate by saying, "In cases of misdemeanor, a peace officer...
has at common law no power of arresting without a warrant, ex-
cept when a breach of the peace has been committed in his
presence .... ,,
The defense had argued that "in his presence" meant that the
officer must be able to detect the offense by one of his senses.
This interpretation, if accepted, together with the argument that
the right of seizure was limited by right of arrest would have
vitiated the whole proceeding (unless of course this could be con-
sidered a breach of peace committed in the officer's presence).
But the Chief Justice pointed out that under this interpretation,
liquor, if being carried by anyone for the third time, could be
seized on information other than the senses; while if it was a first
offense for the one transporting the liquor it could not be seized
unless the officer could detect the presence of the liquor by his
senses as the car passed. This interpretation, he thought, would
be a very narrow one, and such a nice distinction was not ap-
plicable in the present case. "The right to search and the validity
of the seizure are not dependent," he said, "on the right to arrest,"
, Id. at 155.
" Id. at 157.
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but "are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer has
for belief that the contents of the automobile offended against the
law."' 0
In conclusion, he took up the question of whether there was
probable cause for the search and seizure. He took judicial notice
of the fact that Detroit was one of the most active centers for in-
troducing liquor illegally into the United States, and that Grand
Rapids was 152 miles from Detroit. He defined "probable cause"
as the existence of "facts and circumstances" which "warrant a
man of reasonable caution" in believing that an offense has been
committed. He found this situation to have existed and said that
the officers were entitled to use their reasoning faculties upon the
facts of which they had previous knowledge.
This opinion has been severely criticized."- The Court in order
to uphold conviction had to show that the officers had authority
to search the car. This authority was found in Section 6 which
made it a misdemeanor for an officer to search a dwelling without
a warrant, or other property maliciously and without probable
cause without a warrant. Did this clearly show that Congress
meant to change the common law rule and permit search of an
automobile without a warrant? Certainly there was no clear posi-
tive grant of authority to search cars without a warrant; and with-
out statutory authority there is no power to arrest for a misde-
meanor committed out of the presence of the officer, according to
the Chief Justice's own statement of the common law rule. If
Congress had intended to give officers authority to search cars
without a warrant it could have, and no doubt would have said
so in a positive way. Even then there might have been a question
as to whether Congress could constitutionally give such power
in view of the Fourth Amendment, but as Justice McReynolds
pointed out in his dissent in this case, Congress had not attempted
to do so.
Nor do the acts of Congress authorizing customs officials and
Indian agents to search and seize on suspicion and on probable
cause prove the Chief Justice's assertion that on "reason and
authority" vehicles generally could be searched without a war-
"Id. at 158.
'See BLAcEK, ILL STAmRED PRoHIrrnON CASES (Boston: The Gorham Press,
1931), Chapter I.
KENTTKY LAW JoRmNAL
rant. Again, as Justice McReynolds pointed out, these statutes
were specific in conferring authority, leaving nothing to be in-
ferred. And the enforcement of revenue laws was said by the
Court in the Boyd case 12 to be exceptions to the rule embodied in
the Fourth Amendment. What Congress had done in regard to
the enforcement of prohibition was entirely consistent with the
intention of leaving the law as it was. The only difference be-
tween searching a house and an automobile as far as Section 6
was concerned was the fact that the words "maliciously and with-
out probable cause" were added in regard to the search of prop-
erty other than a building. But the words "without probable
cause" were by the Fourth Amendment itself made applicable to
the search of "person, houses, papers and effects"; so, actually,
"maliciously" was the only new element applicable to the search
of vehicles. It may well have been that Congress used this word,
not as a method of granting authority to search without a war-
rant as was assumed by the Court, but merely because Congress
realized that the search of vehicles lent itself much more readily
to "malicious" use than did the search of a dwelling. Criminal
statutes are to be strictly construed and the Fourth Amendment,
the Court had said, was to be liberally construed by the courts to
protect the rights guaranteed by it.13 It would seem that neither
of these rules was followed here.
The Chief Justice cited Section 26 of the Prohibition Act which
said that whenever an officer "discovers" liquor being transported
he could seize it. He interpreted this as not limiting the officer
to what he learned through his senses but as permitting him to
use his reasoning powers. It should be pointed out that this sec-
tion said nothing about the right to "search" as a preliminary to
"seizure." If officers were to seize only when they "discovered" a
violation, it does not follow that they could search on suspicion
or probable cause, and then seize what they found. The legality
of a search is not to be determined by what is found,14 but the
search must be legal from the beginning. He no doubt was correct
in taking the view that the right of seizure was not dependent on
the making of a valid arrest, but that the right to arrest resulted
See first installment of this article in 41 Ky. L. J. 196 (1953).
'For discussion of Boyd v. United States, see 41 Ky. L. J. 196, 201 (1953).
"Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 28 (1927).
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from finding the contraband liquor being transported. But if the
officer found the contraband goods by illegal methods, neither the
seizure nor the arrest would be justified. Since the statute author-
ized the seizure only (and not the search), and then only when
the officer "discovered" the illegal transportation, the basic ques-
tion was the meaning of the word "discovered". The Court in-
terpreted it to mean to learn by any reasonable process, which of
course meant what the Court considered reasonable. It is interest-
ing to note that this identical question was passed upon by the
Supreme Court of Minnesota. The Minnesota statute said that
"whenever any peace officer shall discover any person in the act
of transporting liquor within the state.., such officer shall seize,"
etc. The Minnesota Court said, "the Statute gives authority to
seize but not to search and an officer acting under it is authorized
to seize only what he may discover without the unreasonable
search prohibited by the Constitution."15 This interpretation
would seem to be more in keeping with the principles of in-
terpreting the Fourth Amendment followed by the Court in the
Boyd case.
Nor was the Chief Justice entirely clear or accurate in his
statement and application of the common law rule as to arrest
without a warrant for a misdemeanor not committed in an officer's
presence. His first statement said that the usual rule was that a
police officer "may only arrest without a warrant one guilty of a
misdemeanor if committed in his presence." This is broad enough
to cover all misdemeanors, but in his next sentence he said:
"The rule is sometimes expressed as follows: 'In cases of mis-
demeanor, a peace officer like a private person, has at com-
mon law no power of arresting without a warrant except
when a breach of peace has been committed in his presence
or there is reasonable ground for supposing that a breach
of peace is about to be committed or renewed in his pres-
ence.' The reason for arrest for misdemeanor without a war-
rant at common law was promptly to suppress breaches of
the peace." 1
" State v. Pluth, 157 Minn. 116, 195 N.W. 189 (1923), quoted in BL.cK op.
cit. supra, note 11, at 41.
1 Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 133, 157 (1924).
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This, it would seem, is the correct statement of the original com-
mon law rule, but there is conflict of authority on this point.'7
But in this case there was no question of a breach of peace. The
defendants were peacefully driving down the highway. Their
arrest could not, therefore, be justified under the common law
rule, even if this misdemeanor had been committed in the officer's
presence.
Furthermore, the Chief Justice's use of the term "in his pres-
ence" is subject to serious question. The term seems generally to
have been interpreted to mean in the officer's physical presence,
that is, that the officer must be able to see or hear or acquire
knowledge by some of his senses.
18
But he said officers were permitted to use "their reasoning
faculties upon all the facts of which they had previous knowledge
in respect to the defendants." This would seem clearly to defeat
the purpose of the rule restricting an officer's right to arrest with-
out a warrant to misdemeanors committed in his presence, for
an officer might frequently acquire information about offenses
committed out of his presence. The Chief Justice ruled out
restricting an officer to his physical senses by pointing out that
under the Prohibition Act, which made the first two offenses mis-
demeanors and the third a felony, the officer could, if physical
presence was used, arrest for a third offense on information other
than that acquired through his senses; while for the first two
offenses he would be restricted to information gained through his
senses. He thought this quite an unsatisfactory rule when the for-
feiture of the liquor and car was the object and not the arrest of
the driver of the car. There may be some force in this argument
but the responsibility would seem to be with Congress, not with.
the courts.
The reliance placed by the Chief Justice on Section 970 of the
Revised Statutes seems also to have been improperly placed. This
section provided legal immunity for any officer who seized prop-
erty on "probable cause" if it developed that his actions were mis-
takenly taken. This section of course did not confer or attempt
" See discussion on this point in BLACK, op. cit., supra note 11, at 30-32; but
for conflicting authority see RESTATE~mNT, CRmaNAL PRoCEDUrE, Comments to
See. 21 (1931).
"See RESTATEMENT, CAmrNAL PfROCEDURE, Comments to See. 21 (1931).
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to confer authority to search or seize without a warrant, and the
immunity was available whether the officer acted with or without
a warrant. It seems clearly intended to protect an officer who
acted in good faith, and furnished no test for the legality of a
seizure.
The decision might conceivably be considered sound as a
proper adjustment of the Fourth Amendment to modem condi-
tions, but that the Court took liberties with previous rules of law
can hardly admit of doubt.19
In United States v. Lee20 the Court applied the ruling laid
down in the Carroll case to a vessel seized on the high seas. The
Coast Guard had stopped an American vessel beyond the 12-mile
limit, thrown a search light on it, and, detecting what was thought
to be liquor, brought it to port where it was searched, the liquor
found, and the defendants arrested. Justice Brandeis for the
Court said that the Federal Statute authorized the seizure on the
high seas of American vessels subject to forfeiture for violation of
revenue laws. "From that power," he said, "it is fairly to be in-
ferred that they are likewise authorized to board and search such
vessels when there is probably cause." He found there was prob-
able cause and said the seizure was "lawful, as like search and
seizure of an automobile and arrest of the persons therein by
prohibition officers on land is lawful,"2' citing the Carroll case.
The Court, however, did not clearly find a search on the high seas.
The opinion said, "search, if any, of the motor boat at sea did not
violate the Constitution for it was made by the boatswain as an
incident of a lawful arrest."22 But at a further point the opinion,
in referring to the use of the searchlight, said, "no search on the
high seas is shown... such use of a searchlight is comparable to
the use of a marine glass or a field glass" and is "not prohibited
by the Constitution."
23
Beginning with Agnello v. United States24 the Court had be-
fore it a number of cases involving the question as to the extent
of the authority to search as an incident of a lawful arrest. Frank
"Accord with Case, Husty v. United States, 282 U. S. 694 (1930).
"274 U. S. 559 (1927).
"Id. at 562.
Id. at 563.
"Id. at 563. See also, Maul v. United States, 274 U. S. 501 (1927).
"269 U. S. 20 (1925).
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Agnello along with others was arrested for selling narcotics.
Federal agents had stood outside the house of Stephen Alba, one
of the defendants, and watched through the window while the
defendants sold narcotics to other federal agents. After the sale
the agents who were watching outside entered the house and ar-
rested defendants. The agents then went to the home of Agnello
several blocks away, from which the package of narcotics had
been obtained, searched his house without a warrant, and found
an additional can of cocaine. The question before the Court was
whether search of Agnello's house and the seizure of the narcotics
therein violated the Fourth Amendment, and whether the admis-
sion of the evidence found by the search violated the Fifth
Amendment. The Court, speaking unanimously through Justice
Butler, said:
"the right without a search warrant contemporaneously to
search persons lawfully arrested while committing crime
and to search the place where the arrest is made in order
to find and seize things connected with the crime as its
fruits or as the means by which it was committed.., is not
to be doubted .... The legality of the arrests ... made at
the home of Alba is not questioned ... or of the searches
and seizures .... But the right does not extend to other
places .... When it (Agnello's house) was entered and
searched, the conspiracy was ended and defendants were
under arrest and in custody elsewhere. That search cannot
be sustained as an incident of the arrests." 5
After discussing decisions of the state and federal courts to
find authority for what was done here, he said,
"absence of any judicial approval is persuasive authority
that it is unlawful. Belief, however, well founded, that an
article sought is concealed in a dwelling furnishes no justifi-
cation for a search of that place without a warrant."20
The government contended that, even if the search and seizure
were unlawful, the evidence was admissible because no applica-
tion had been made by defendants to have the evidence (a can
of cocaine) retumed. But the Court pointed out that prior to its
being offered as evidence Agnello did not know his house had
2Id. at 30.' Id. at 33,
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been searched and evidence found therein. Under these circum-
stances the Court thought it would be "unreasonable to hold that
he was bound to apply for the return of an article which he main-
tained he never had." As to the Fifth Amendment the opinion
said:
"Where, by uncontroverted facts, it appears that a search
and seizure were made in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment, there is no reason why one whose rights have been so
violated and who is sought to be incriminated by evidence
so obtained, may not invoke protection of the Fifth Amend-
ment immediately and without any application for the re-
turn of the thing seized."27
The judgment of conviction of Agnello was, therefore, set
aside but the conviction of the other defendants allowed to stand
since the illegal evidence was used against Agnello only.
In Marron v. United States28 the Court had a more difficult
case involving seizure incidental to a lawful arrest. Marron,
Birdsall, and others were indicted for conspiracy to violate the
prohibition law by maintaining a nuisance where liquor was sold.
Petitioner was a lessee of the entire second floor of a building con-
sisting of six or seven rooms. Prohibition agents got a warrant to
search for and seize "intoxicating liquor and articles for its manu-
facture." When the agents arrived petitioner was not there but
Birdsall was in charge selling liquor to about a dozen people.
Birdsall was arrested and the agents searched the place and found
liquor, some of which was in a closet. While in the closet, they
seized a ledger showing inventories of liquors, receipts, expenses,
including gifts to police officers, and they found beside the cash
register a number of bills against petitioners for gas, electricity,
water, and telephone service. They seized the ledger and bills
but reported only the seizure of the liquor in the return on the
warrant. Petitioner applied before trial in the lower court for the
return of the ledger and bills and asked to have the evidence con-
cerning them suppressed because they were not described in the
warrant. This was denied, and at the trial the evidence showed
that the entries in the ledger were made by petitioner Marron and
that he was the proprietor. The government contended that the
• rId. at 34.
275 U. S. 192 (1927).
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seizure of the ledger and bills could be justified either as an in-
cident to the execution of the search warrant or as a right incident
to the lawful arrest of Birdsall when caught in the act of violating
the law.
Justice Butler spoke for the Court in a unanimous opinion. He
took up first the argument that the seizure was justified as incident
to the execution of the warrant. Beginning with the statement
that the Fourth Amendment clearly prohibited general searches,
he quoted the Weeks' case that the Court had to protect the
people "against unreasonable searches and seizures under the
guise of law."20 He cited the various sections of federal statutes
which set forth detailed and specific requirements as to issuing
and executing search warrants. "The requirement that warrants
shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general
searches under them impossible," he said, "and prevents the
seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to
what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer
executing the warrant."30 He discussed Adams v. New York31
which was relied on by the government as permitting the use of
evidence not within the scope of a valid warrant, and said it did
not support the government's argument since in that case the
Court did not decide whether the seizure violated the Fourth
Amendment. He concluded this part of the opinion by saying, "It
is clear that the seizure of the ledger and bills... was not author-
ized by the warrant.
3 2
He took up the additional argument of the government,
namely that the seizure was justified as an incident of a lawful
arrest. The Prohibition Act made the maintenance of a place for
the selling of liquor a nuisance and provided punishment for
maintaining such a place. Birdsall was caught in the act of main-
taining the nuisance. "The officers were authorized to arrest for
crime being committed in their presence," he said, and "they had
a right without a warrant contemporaneously to search the place
in order to find and seize the things used to carry on the criminal
enterprise." He then pointed out that the closet was used as
'Id. at 196.
30 Id. at 196.
192 U. S. 585 (1904). For a discussion of this case, see the first installment
of this article in 41 Ky. L. J. 196, 202-205 (1953).
Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192, 198 (1927).
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part of the saloon and that the ledger was part of the "equipment
actually used to commit the offense," and, "while it was not on
Birdsall's person at the time of his arrest, it was in his immediate
possession and control." "The authority of officers to search and
seize the things by which the nuisance was being maintained, ex-
tended to all parts of the premises used for the unlawful pur-
pose,"33 he concluded. The ledger and bills were, therefore, law-
fully seized as an incident of the arrest.
Three years after the above case two others very similar in
facts and involving the principle of the Marron case came before
the Court. These were Go-Bart v. United States and Lefkowitz v.
United States.3 In the Go-Bart case prohibition agents had on
June 5, 1929 secured a warrant for the arrest of Gowens, Bartels,
and others, officers of the company, on the ground that they had
been engaged in a conspiracy since January 1st to violate the
Prohibition Law by having, selling, and transporting liquor. The
agents went to the company's office and arrested Bartels, secre-
tary-treasurer, who was there when they entered, searched his
person and took some papers from him; Gowens, president of the
company, came in and was arrested and searched. The agents
then took keys from the men and through threats of force com-
pelled them to open a desk and safe and under the pretense of
having a search warrant they searched the office taking books,
papers, letter files, insurance policies, cancelled checks, index
cards, etc. belonging to the company. The warrant for the arrest
was admitted by the government later to be defective on its face
and there was no search warrant at all. But the agents did have
reliable information about the conspiratorial activities of the
petitioners during 1927-28, which the government claimed justi-
fied arrest without a warrant and search of the place as incident
n Id. at 199.
"282 U. S. 344 (1931); 285 U. S. 452 (1931). In McGuire v. United States
273 U. S. 95 (1927), revenue agents under a warrant searched McGuire's premises
and found liquor, destroying some of it and keeping part of it as evidence.
Petitioner contended the destruction was illegal and hence the officers became
trespassers ab initio and lost the protection and authority of the warrant. But the
Court held that the rule of trespasser ab initio has "only been applied in civil
actions", and that its extension wa's not favored. There was no invasion here with-
out a warrant, said the Court, and the seizure and retention of the liquor was dis-
tinct from the offense of destroying some of it. "Neither the seizure of this ligquor
nor its use as evidence infringed any constitutional immunity of the accused,' it
concluded.
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to the lawful arrest. The petitioners asked the court before trial
to enjoin the use of the papers as evidence and to have them re-
turned as having been taken contrary to the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.
Justice Butler wrote the opinion for the Court. He began by
emphasizing that the Fourth Amendment should be liberally con-
strued to prevent unreasonable searches and seizures, but said
there was no formula for determining reasonableness. The only
question before the Court was the validity of the search and
seizure of the papers. He assumed that the arrests were legal
not because the warrant was good but because the agents had
enough information as to past conduct of the petitioners to au-
thorize their arrest. As to the validity of the search and seizure
as an incident to a lawful arrest, he said it could not be claimed
that "the officers saw conspiracy being committed ... and there
is no suggestion that Gowens or Bartels was committing a crime
when arrested." A conspiracy might have existed in 1927-28 but
"the record does not show any criminal overt act in 1929."Il
He then pointed out that the agents had the necessary informa-
tion and time to get a search warrant and failed to do so but
pretended to have one. "It was a lawless invasion of the premises
and a general exploratory search," 6 he concluded.
In the Lefkowitz case the facts were almost identical with
those in the Go-Bart case except that here the federal agents had a
valid warrant for the arrest of the respondents on the charge of
conspiracy to violate the Prohibition Law by selling, possessing,
transporting, and taking orders for and delivering liquor. The
respondents operated from room 604 at 1547 Broadway, New
York City. The room was ten feet wide and twenty feet long but
was divided by a partition. In the outer office was a stenographer's
desk, towel cabinet, and waste basket; in the inner part was a
desk and waste basket. The agents arrested the two respondents,
searched them and the room, opening desks and carrying away
books and papers; they searched the towel cabinet and took
papers from it and from the waste basket which they pieced to-
gether. The question before the Court was the legality of the
search and seizure of the papers as incident to a valid arrest.
' Go-Bart v. United States, 282 U. S. 344, 358 (1931).
'OId. at 358.
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Justice Butler again wrote the opinion and decided the case on
the strength of the Go-Bart ruling. He pointed out that the of-
fense charged involved the use of the room to take orders for
liquor, cause it to be delivered, and to collect and divide the pro-
ceeds. He said the records did not support the claim that at the
time of arrest "the offense for which the warrant issued or any
other crime was being committed in the presence of the officers."
37
No conspiracy was "being had, made or formed in their presence,
he said. As to the right to search as an incident of a lawful arrest,
he said it was no greater than the right to search under a search
warrant, and the papers here "could not lawfully be searched for
and taken even under a search warrant" because of the ruling in
Gould v. United States,38 which held that a man's own private
papers could not be seized to be used against him.
In both this case and in the Go-Bart opinion justice Butler was
faced with his decision in the Marron case in which he had said
that as an incident of a lawful arrest the "place" (in that case the
entire second floor consisting of six or seven rooms) could be
searched to find and seize the things used to carry on the criminal
enterprise. In the Marron case, he pointed out, Birdsall was found
in the act of running the saloon in carrying out the conspiracy,
and as an incident of the lawful arrest the officers seized the
ledger from the closet, some bills found beside the cash register
which were used in furthering the conspiracy and which "were
visible, accessible and in the offender's immediate custody." The
offense there, he said, "involved the element of continuity... the
ledger and bills being in plain view were picked up by the officers
... no search for them was made," and "the ledger was held to be
part of the outfit actually used to commit the offense;" while in
the Lefkowitz case "the searches were exploratory and general
and made solely to find evidence of respondents' guilt of the
alleged conspiracy or some other crime." The papers and other
articles "though intended to be used to solicit orders for liquor in
violation of the Act... were in themselves unoffending."3 9
His effort to distinguish the Marion case from the other two is
' Lefkowitz v. United States, 285 U. S. 452, 462 (1931).
' Id. at 46M For a discussion of Could v. United States see, first installment
of this article in 41 Ky. L. J. 196, 207-208 (1953).
1 Lefkowvitz v. United States, 285 U. S. 452, 465 (1931).
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certainly not entirely convincing. In the former case as an inci-
dent of a lawful arrest the agents were permitted to search the
"place", six or seven rooms; they searched a closet and took from
it a ledger, and also took from beside the cash register some bills-
all of which were "in themselves unoffending." In each of the
latter two cases the agents were not permitted to search a small
office. In the Marron case the charge was a conspiracy to violate
the Prohibition Law in a number of ways, including the mainte-
nance of a nuisance; in the latter two cases the charge was a con-
spiracy to violate the law by buying, selling, and delivering. Yet
in both of these cases the Court said that the accused when ar-
rested in their offices where the illegal conspiracies were being
carried on and with incriminating papers in their possession were
not committing any conspiracy in the presence of the arresting
officers. If the ledger and bills in the Marron case were evidence
of the criminal enterprise and used in carrying it on it is difficult
to see why the papers and books in the latter case were not also.
The decisions left unanswered the question of exactly how far the
right to search as an incident of a lawful arrest extended.
Two prohibition cases which came before the Court involved
the question of the use in the federal courts of evidence acquired
by illegal search and seizure by state officials. The use of evidence
seized illegally by private individuals was considered in Burdeau
v. McDowell,40 and the court took the view that the Fourth
Amendment protected the individual only from unreasonable
search and seizure by government officials. And in Adams v. New
York4' the Court had refused to concern itself with the method by
which competent evidence was obtained.
In the first of the prohibition cases, Byars v. United States,
42
the question before the Court involved both the validity of the
search warrant and the legality of joint action by state and federal
authorities. Petitioner had been convicted for having in his pos-
session with fraudulent intent some counterfeit strip stamps used
on whiskey bottled-in-bond. His house was searched and the
stamps found under a warrant issued by an Iowa municipal
judge to "any peace officer in Des Moines, Polk County, Iowa" and
40 See, first installment of this article in 41 Ky. L. J. 196, 209 (1953).
4
1 Id. at 202.
273 U. S. 28 (1927).
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which authorized the search for and seizure of liquor and material
and instruments used in making liquor. The warrant stated only
that "affiant has good reason to believe and does believe the de-
fendant has in his possession" such liquor and instruments. It
was given to a police officer who took with him three other police-
men and Adams, a federal officer. Adams kept the stamps and
they were used against the petitioner over his objection that the
seizure violated the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Sutherland wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court.
He began by saying "the warrant is clearly bad if tested by the
Fourth Amendment," citing three lower federal court decisions
holding that a valid warrant must state more than that the affiant
"has good reason to believe," and that the evidence must show
probable cause.43 The fact that four police officers went with
Adams to search a four room house showed, he thought, that
Adams was not needed and that his participation "in the search
was under color of his federal office and that the search in sub-
stance and effect was a joint operation."44 "In that view . . . the
effect is the same as though he had engaged in the undertaking
as one exclusively his own," the opinion said. Nor did the fact
that evidence was found make the search legal, for an illegal
search "is not made lawful by what it brings to light."45 He
pointed out that the stamps were not within the purview of the
writ and hence presumably the seizure was bad for that reason
also, but his decision was based primarily on the ground of the
vagueness of the warrant.
In Gambino v. United States, 46 New York state troopers, be-
lieving they were required by law to help enforce the Prohibition
Law (after the New York Prohibition Law had been repealed),
arrested Gambino and Lima, searched their car and seized liquor
which was found in it. The troopers had no warrant. The men
and the liquor were turned over to federal authorities who in-
" Ripper v. United States, 178 F. 24 (1910); United States v. Borkowski, 268
F. 408 (1920); United States v. Kelly, 277 F. 485 (1921). In the first of these
cases the warrant vas held bad because it was based on "good reason to believe"
but the evidence was admitted on the basis of Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585
(1904). In United States v. Kelly the warrant was held bad for the same reason,
the warrant was quashed, and the property ordered returned.
"Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 33 (1927).
5Id. at 29.
"275 U. S. 310 (1927).
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dicted and convicted the men of conspiracy to import and trans-
port liquor in violation of the Prohibition Act. The defendants
moved before trial to have the liquor returned to them and sup-
pressed as evidence because the arrest and search were without
a warrant and without probable cause in violation of the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. The government contended the
evidence was admissible because there was probable cause and
because it was not shown that the state troopers were agents of
the United States. The defense, in addition to pleading lack of
probable cause, claimed that the Prohibition Law in imposing the
duty of enforcement upon "any officer of the law" made the state
troopers federal agents.
Justice Brandeis wrote the unanimous opinion. Without go-
ing into details of facts or reasons he said, "We are of opinion on
the facts, which it is unnecessary to detail, that there was not
probable cause. We are also of the opinion that the term 'any
officer of the law' used in Section 26 refers only to federal officers,
and that the troopers were not, at the time of the arrest and
seizure, agents of the United States."47 But he said, there was a
question as to whether the troopers' "relation to the federal
prosecution was such as to require the exclusion of their evidence
wrongfully obtained."4 Judicial notice was taken of the fact that
the "troopers believed that they were required by law to aid in
enforcing the National Prohibition Act," and that they acted in
performance of that "supposed duty."49 He quoted from a state-
ment made by the Governor of New York when he signed the
bill repealing that state's prohibition law in which it was stated
that state peace officers were "required to aid in the enforcement
of the federal law." Such aid had been previously given and ac-
cepted by federal authorities, he said. Although in this particular
case the troopers had not acted under the direction of federal of-
ficials, yet they acted "solely on behalf of the United States."
Rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments "may be invaded
as effectively by such cooperation as by the state officers' acting
under direction of the federal officials," he said. He continued by
saying that the prosecution "instituted by the federal authorities
4" Id. at 313.
,8 Id. at 314.
'Id. at 315.
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was, as conducted, in effect a ratification of the arrest, search, and
seizure made by the troopers on behalf of the United States." 0
In discussing previous decisions, none of which he thought con-
flicted with his conclusion here, he distinguished Burdeau v. Mc-
Dowell by saying that there the papers were taken by "private
detectives". He admitted that in several cases lower federal
courts had admitted evidence obtained by illegal search by state
officials but maintained that in only three could it be contended
that the search and seizure was "made solely for the purpose of
aiding in the enforcement of the federal law." Only one of these,
Schroeder v. United States,51 was worthy of consideration, he
thought, and in that case "the police officer was a confidential in-
vestigator, charged with the task of detecting corruption and other
dereliction of duty on the part of other police officers"52 and was
not acting solely to enforce the prohibition law.
This was extending the principle laid down in the Byars case
considerably. There the use of the evidence was not permitted
because a federal official participated with state police, thus mak-
ing it a joint enterprise under a warrant which would have been
fatally defective if issued to a federal official; here the evidence
was excluded because it had been taken illegally by state officials
on the theory that its use by the federal government constituted
ratification of the illegal seizure. On similar reasoning a lower
federal court barred evidence taken illegally by state police under
circumstances indicating that federal officials inspired the illegal
search and seizure.53 It would seem that on the same reasoning
the use in Burdeau v. McDowell of the evidence taken "by pri-
vate detectives" would have been a ratification of their illegal act
also, but the majority would not go so far at that time. It should
be noted that both Justices Brandeis and Holmes dissented in the
Burdeau case and wanted to exclude the evidence there.
In another prohibition case, Olmstead v. United States,54 a
new and novel question came before the Court. It involved the
application of the Fourth Amendment to telephone conversations.
The facts were that federal agents knew that Olmstead was the
50 Id. at 317.
a 7F. 2d 60 (1925).
E2 Gambino v. United States, 275 U. S. 310, 319 (1927).
' Flagg v. United States, 233 F. 481 (1916).
r277 U. S. 438 (1928).
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head of a large rum-runing and "bootlegging" ring with head-
quarters in an office building in Seattle, Washington. In order to
secure evidence against the group, federal agents tapped the tele-
phone wires of Olmstead outside his office by dropping a wire
attached to his telephone down to the basement of the building,
where they listened and made a typewritten record of the con-
versations. This record was used as evidence against Olmstead
over his objection that the method of gathering the information
and its use violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
Chief Justice Taft wrote the majority opinion holding the evi-
dence admissible. Justice Holmes, Brandeis, Stone, and Butler
dissented. The Chief Justice took a strictly literal interpretation
of the Amendment. He reviewed previous court decisions in-
terpreting it and pointed out its historical purpose to protect the
individual from the government. "The amendment itself shows,"
he said, "that the search is to be of material things-the person,
the house, his papers or his effects." In this case, he pointed out,
"There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence
was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only.
There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants."55
He distinguished the case of Ex parte Jackson in which the court
held the Amendment protected a sealed letter from search except
with a search warrant, saying "the letter is a paper, an effect," a
material thing. He thought the language of the amendment could
not be expanded to include telephone wires reaching from the de-
fendants office or house. "The intervening wires are not part of his
house or office, any more than are the highways along which they
are stretched,"56 he said.
He then considered the view that the evidence ought not to
be admitted because it was obtain by unethical methods and in
violation of the law of Washington, which made wire tapping a
misdemeanor. He dealt with the argument that the evidence was
obtained by illegal means by saying, "The common law rule is
that the admissibility of evidence is not affected by the illegality
of the means by which it was obtained." The Weeks case was, he
said, an exception to the common law rule required by the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments and was not followed by many state
m Id. at 464.
Id. at 465.
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courts. "The common law rule must apply in the case at bar,"
he said. As to the argument that the evidence was obtained by
unethical methods, he took the position that without the sanction
of congressional legislation the courts had no "discretion to ex-
clude evidence ... because unethically secured." "This would,"
he said, "be at variance with the common law doctrine generally
supported by authority."
57
The majority opinion, therefore, took a very literal view of the
Amendment and said there was no search or seizure of a material
thing and there had been no entry of the houses or offices of the
defendants. It should be pointed out that in the Boyd case,"'
where the Amendment was first interpreted and applied and
which the Chief Justice discussed approvingly, there was no entry
into a house or office and actually no literal search or seizure. The
defendant was ordered to produce his papers in court on penalty
of having the charges taken as confessed and his property for-
feited if he failed to produce the papers. The Court considered
this the equivalent of an unreasonable search and seizure, and
decided the case on the basis of principle.
In their separate dissents both Justices Holmes and Brandeis
thought it was bad policy to admit evidence obtained by un-
ethical and criminal conduct. Justice Holmes stated his position
thus: "For my part I think it a less evil that some criminals should
escape than that the government should play an ignoble part."59
Justice Brandeis thought that if the amendment protected a sealed
letter when the mail is a governmental service it should protect
a telephone conversation, and pointed out that the "invasion of
the privacy of the telephone is far greater than that involved in
tampering with the mails. Whenever a telephone line is tapped,
the privacy of the persons at both ends of the line is invaded and
all conversations between them upon any subject, and although
proper, confidential and privileged, may be overheard." 60 This
latter consideration was also emphasized by Justice Butler in his
dissent.
The last significant prohibition case was Taylor v. United
5 Id. at 468.
'MSee discussion in 41 Ky. L. J. 196, 198-202 (1953).
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 470 (1928).
6 Id. at 476.
p286 U. S. 1 (1932).
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States.61 Agents had received complaints about the selling of
liquor from Taylor's garage. About 2:30 a.m. they went to his
garage without a warrant of any kind; they thought they smelled
whiskey inside and looking through a small opening with a search
light they saw several cardboard boxes which they assumed con-
tained liquor. They broke open a door, searched the garage, and
found 122 cases of whiskey which they seized. Taylor came from
the house and was arrested. Justice McReynolds wrote a brief
opinion for the entire Court, reversing the conviction in the lower
court which had refused to suppress the evidence. He said:
"the agents had made no effort to obtain a warrant for mak-
ing a search. They had abundant opportunity to do so and
to proceed in an orderly way even after the odor had em-
phasized their suspicions.... We think the evidence was
obtained unlawfully and should have been suppressed."
He went on to say that agents could:
"rely on a distinctive odor as a physical fact indicative of
possible crime; but its presence alone does not strip the
owner of a building of constitutional guarantees against un-
reasonable search."
62
This seems at variance with a federal Circuit Court's decision
upholding the search without a warrant of a dwelling in reliance
upon the sense of smell. In writing the opinion the judge said:
"I see no reason why the power of arrest may not exist, if
the act of commission appeals to the sence of smell as well
as to that of sight."63
In the Taylor case above the use of smell was supported by the
sense of sight, for the agents with the use of a light looked
through the cracks in the garage. It may well be that the attitude
of the Court here and in the Go-Bart and Lepkowitz cases which
seem out of line with previous decisions reflected somewhat the
increasing public hostility to prohibition.
Interpretations by the Supreme Court of the term "probable
cause" have been important in determining the significance of
'-'Id. at 6.
"United States v. Borkowski, 268 F. 408, 412 (1920). See also, McBride v.
United States, 285 F. 416 (1922), in which search of a stable without a warrant
in reliance on smell was upheld.
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the Fourth Amendment, and in some cases the specific set of
facts are important in understanding the Court's ruling.
In the Carroll case, as has been seen, the Court defined prob-
able cause as "facts and circumstances . . . such as to warrant a
man of prudence and caution in believing that an offense has been
committed." In the Byars case it said a warrant based on an af-
fidavit that affiant "had good cause to believe and did believe"
without stating facts to show probable cause was bad. In Lee v.
United States and in Gambino v. United States, Justice Brandeis
merely stated that probable cause did exist without detailing the
facts which constituted it. In Husty v. United States64 prohibition
agents received reports by telephone that Husty, who was known
to the agents as a "bootlegger" by his previous arrests and con-
victions, had two loads of liquor in cars parked in a certain place.
They went without a warrant to the parking place and found
Husty in the process of driving away. They stopped him, searched
the car, found liquor and arrested him. The Court upheld the
conviction by the evidence thus obtained on the basis of the Car-
roll case saying that the search of a car without a warrant was
legal whenever there was probable cause and that "arrest for
illegal transportation or possession need not precede the search."
"To show probable cause," the opinion said, "it is not necessary
that the arresting officer should have had before him legal evi-
dence of the suspected illegal act.., it is enough if the apparent
facts . . . are sufficient to lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe liquor is illegally possessed in the automobile to be
searched."6 5
In Grau v. United States6 the petitioner was convicted on two
counts, one charging unlawful manufacture of whiskey, and the
second, possession of property designed for that purpose. He
challenged the use of the evidence obtained by officers searching
his house under a warrant because it failed to state particular
grounds or probable cause and also because it was based on two
affidavits neither of which did so. Justice Roberts wrote the
opinion, and said it was not necessary to consider the validity of
the warrant itself because the objection to the affidavits was well
- 282 U. S. 694 (1930).
65Id. at 701.8287 U. S. 124 (1932).
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taken. Only one of them attempted to state the grounds and did
so as follows:
"On or about October 18, 1931 he, afflant, went around and
about the premises hereinafter described and saw persons
haul cans, commonly used in handling whiskey, and what
appeared to be corn sugar up to and into the place and
saw the same car or truck haul similar cans, apparently
heavily loaded away from there and smelled odors and
fumes of cooking mash coming from the place, and he says
there is a still and whiskey mash on the premises."'t
Section 25 of the Prohibition Act said there shall be no search of
a "private dwelling occupied as such unless it is being used for
the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor, or unless it is in part used
for some business purpose, such as a store, shop, saloon, restau-
rant, hotel or boarding house.""' The lower court had held that
the affidavit warranted the belief that the dwelling was being
used as headquarters for "merchandising" of liquor and that this
was sufficient compliance with Section 25 as to the sale of liquor.
But Justice Roberts said this broad interpretation of the Act "un-
duly narrowed the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment in
consonance with which the statute was passed." He pointed out
that "the affidavit fails to say the place is not a private dwelling
and the evidence shows that it was." "At most," he said, "the
deposition charges the manufacture of whiskey; no averment of
sale is made; indeed no facts are given from which sale... neces-
sarily is to be inferred." "A search warrant may issue only upon
evidence which would be competent in the trial of the offense
before a jury.. ." and "would lead a man of prudence and caution
to believe that the offense has been committed,"69 he concluded.
This would seem to be going pretty far in restricting the issuance
of warrants even to search a dwelling, especially when lower fed-
eral courts have held that officers in reliance on their sense of
smell can search a building without a warrant.7 0 It would seem
that the evidence here would justify a man of "prudence and
rId. at 127.
27 U. S. C. A., Sec. 39.
Grau v. United States, 287 U. S. 124, 128 (1932). Accord: Nathanson v.
United States, 290 U. S. 41 (1933).
" United States v. Borkowski, 268 F, 408 (1920); McBride v. United States,
284 F. 216 (1922).
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caution" in believing a violation of the law was being committed.
Two justices, Stone and Cardozo, dissented without writing
opinions. No doubt the extremeness of the decision was due
partly to the fact that it was a dwelling that was searched as in
the Byers case rather than personal property such as an auto-
mobile which was involved in the cases above in which the war-
rants were upheld on a more liberal interpretation of probable
cause. 7
1
(To be continued)
In Syro v. United States, 287 U. S. 206 (1932), the Court, in interpreting a
provision of the Federal statute requiring search warrants to be executed within ten
days, held that one was void if not executed in that time and that redating it
would not revive it. "The proceeding by search warrant is," the Court said, "a
drastic one. Its abuse led to the adoption of the Fourth Amendment," and there-
fore the amendment and legislation regulating the process "should be liberally con-
strued in favor of the individual." In Albrecht v. United States, 273 U. S. 1
(1926), the Court said an arrest under a warrant based on an affidavit before a
state notary public not authorized to administer oaths in federal criminal pro-
ceedings violated the Fourth Amendment.
